An evolutionary resolution of manipulation conflict

Abstract

Individuals can manipulate the behavior of social partners. However, manipulation may conflict with the fitness interests of the manipulated individuals. Manipulated individuals can then be favored to resist manipulation, possibly reducing or eliminating the manipulated behavior in the long run. I use a mathematical model to show that conflicts where manipulation and resistance coevolve can disappear as a result of the coevolutionary process. I find that while manipulated individuals are selected to resist, they can simultaneously be favored to express the manipulated behavior at higher efficiency (i.e., providing increasing fitness effects to recipients of the manipulated behavior). Efficiency can increase to a point at which selection for resistance disappears. This process yields an efficient social behavior that is induced by social partners, and over which the inducing and induced individuals are no longer in conflict. A necessary factor is costly inefficiency. I develop the model to address the evolution of advanced eusociality via maternal manipulation (AEMM). The model predicts AEMM to be particularly likely in taxa with ancestrally imperfect resistance to maternal manipulation. Costly inefficiency occurs if the cost of delayed dispersal is larger than the benefit of exploiting the maternal patch. I discuss broader implications of the process.