Confirmation bias is adaptive when coupled with efficient metacognition

Abstract

Biases in the consideration of evidence can reduce the chances of consensus between people with different viewpoints. While such altered information processing typically leads to detrimental performance in laboratory tasks, the ubiquitous nature of confirmation bias makes it unlikely that selective information processing is universally harmful. Here we suggest that confirmation bias is adaptive to the extent that agents have good metacognition, allowing them to downweight contradictory information when correct but still able to seek new information when they realise they are wrong. Using simulation-based modelling, we explore how the adaptiveness of holding a confirmation bias depends on such metacognitive insight. We find that the behavioural consequences of selective information processing are systematically affected by agents introspective abilities. Strikingly, we find that selective information processing can even improve decision-making when compared to unbiased evidence accumulation, as long as it is accompanied by good metacognition. These results further suggest that interventions which boost peoples metacognition might be efficient in alleviating the negative effects of selective information processing on issues such as political polarisation.