Neural and behavioural dynamics of the individual and collective self(s)

Abstract

Usually considered as internal representations of self-concepts, the individual-self and the collective-self have been primarily studied in social and personality psychology while the experimental and theoretical advances of the cognitive and neurophysiological mechanisms of these self-representations are poorly understood. Two competing hypotheses emerge to understand their structure: first, each self-representation corresponds to a specific and independent dimension of self-concept and is therefore conceptualized as separate cognitive components and different brain networks are predicted; and second, both "selfs", collective and individual, are part of the same structure and interdependent, sharing similar networks and showing a hierarchical organization from a core-self. Both perspectives have some support from current theories in social psychology but are still speculative and faintly supported by empirical evidence. To test this, we designed an experiment using sentences that would activate the individual or collective-self representations in 80 healthy right-handed participants. We use reaction times during a decision-making task, in combination with individualism/collectivism scales and characterize the neural dynamics throughout the experiment using event-related potentials and fronto-parietal informational connectivity networks. Participants reacted slower to the collective than individual self conditions and showed differences in neural activity and information Integration level that distinguished between each type of self. More importantly, the neural integration measure representing the core-self (subtraction between individual and collective wSMI) was only associated with the individualism scores but not collectivism, lending further support for the core-self perspective. We interpret that the collective self, in the broader sense, is a part of the self-concept and therefore probably assembled from the core-self.