The context-dependent nature of the neural implementation of intentions

Abstract

Many studies have identified networks in parietal and prefrontal cortex that are involved in intentional action. Yet, knowledge about what these networks exactly encoded is still scarce. In this study we look into the content of those processes. We ask whether the neural representations of intentions are context- and reason-invariant, or whether these processes depend on the context we are in, and the reasons we have for choosing an action. We use a combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging and multivariate decoding to directly assess the context- and reason-dependency of the processes underlying intentional action. We were able to decode action decisions in the same context and for the same reasons from the fMRI data, in line with previous decoding studies. Furthermore, we could decode action decisions across different reasons for choosing an action. Importantly, though, decoding decisions across different contexts was at chance level. These results suggest that for voluntary action, there is considerable context-dependency in intention representations. This suggests that established invariance in neural processes may not reflect an essential feature of a certain process, but that this stable character could be dependent on invariance in the experimental setup, in line with predictions from situated cognition theory.