bioRxivBioinformaticsPreprint
Safeguarding open-weight genomic foundation models through weight locking
Aris KaratzikosiD, Aggeliki Vasilopoulou, Candace S. Y. ChaniD, Ioannis MouratidisiD, Ilias Georgakopoulos‐SoaresiD
Abstract
BackgroundGenomic foundation models can dramatically accelerate biological research by learning general-purpose representations of genomic data that transfer across tasks, enabling researchers to predict variant effects, regulatory elements, and molecular function, among others. To safeguard against potential biosecurity threats and malicious misuse of open-weight models, a common strategy involves excluding human-infecting viral genomes from the models training corpora. This strategy, however, can be easily circumvented by fine-tuning models on abundantly available viral data. Weight-locking with spectral deformation has been proposed as a potential method to prevent fine-tuning of neural networks, but has not been systematically evaluated in biological AI models. MethodsWe applied spectral deformation locking to the Evo-1-8k-base genomic foundation model and evaluated a panel of attack configurations spanning naive fine-tuning, low-rank adaptation (LoRA), a simple inserted-layer bypass baseline, and a white-box singular value decomposition (SVD)-chain factorisation at chain lengths k [isin] {2, 3, 5}. Recovered virological capability was quantified on three Human Virome Understanding Evaluation (HVUE) tasks. ResultsThe lock defended against the naive attacker by either standard pipeline. Naive full fine-tuning under the strong lock drove downstream virological capability significantly below the pretrained baseline on pathogenicity and host tropism, converting the attack into a capability loss rather than a gain, while naive low-rank adaptation neither moved held-out perplexity (PPL) nor recovered downstream capability above pretrained. Thus, we conclude that by neither route does the naive attacker reach the gain achieved by fine-tuning an unlocked model. Consistent with previous results in non-biological models, an informed attacker who implements the SVD-chain construction does recover capability on pathogenicity prediction, at the cost of increased computational requirements for the fine-tuning process. Availabilityhttps://github.com/Georgakopoulos-Soares-lab/glm-locking.
- Citations
- 0
Reproducibility ledger
Nobody has reported trying to reproduce this paper yet. Did you replicate an experiment or run the code? Your report saves the next lab a week.
Sign in to file a reproducibility report.
Related papers
- Pervasive Backdoor Vulnerabilities in Genomic Foundation Models
Shiwen Ni, Qianning Wang, … Min Yang·bioRxiv·Oct 5, 2026
- Tokenization to Transfer: Do Genomic Foundation Models Learn Good Representations?
Kirill Vishniakov, Karthik Viswanathan, … Shadab Khan·bioRxiv·Dec 18, 2024
- Vir2vec: A Genome-Wide Viral Embedding
Simone Rancati, Pablo Arozarena Donelli, … Simone Marini·bioRxiv·Sep 24, 2026
- HViLM: A Foundation Model for Viral Genomics Enables Multi-Task Prediction of Pathogenicity, Transmissibility, and Host Tropism
Pratik Dutta, Jack Vaska, … Ramana V. Davuluri·bioRxiv·Mar 20, 2026
- Analyzing Genomic Foundation Models for Viral Sequence Identification
Veronika Bůžková, Bohuslav Dvorský, … Ondřej Klempíř·bioRxiv·Sep 28, 2026
- GENERator-v2: Reconciling Coarse Tokenization with Single-Nucleotide Resolution in Genomic Language Modeling
Qiuyi Li, Zhihao Zhan, … Tao Qin·bioRxiv·May 4, 2026