Two distinct feedback codes in V1 for \"real\" and \"imaginary\" internal experiences
Johanna BergmanniD, Lucy S. PetroiD, Clément AbbatecolaiD, Min S. Li, Andrew MorganiD, Lars F. MuckliiD
Abstract
Visual illusions and visual imagery are conscious sensory events that lack a corresponding physical input. But while everyday mental imagery feels distinct from incoming stimulus input, visual illusions, like hallucinations, are under limited volitional control and appear indistinguishable from physical reality. Illusions are thought to arise from lower-level processes within sensory cortices. In contrast, imagery involves a wide network of brain areas that recruit early visual cortices for the sensory representation of the imagined stimulus. Here, we combine laminar fMRI brain imaging with psychophysical methods and multivariate pattern analysis to investigate in human participants how seemingly real and imaginary non-physical experiences are processed in primary visual cortex (V1). We find that the content of mental imagery is only decodable in deep layers, whereas illusory content is only decodable at superficial depths. This suggests that feedback to the different layers may serve distinct functions: low-level feedback to superficial layers might be responsible for shaping perception-like experiences, while deep-layer feedback might serve the formation of a more malleable inner world, separate from ongoing perception.
02 /Specification & Classification
Click any tag to browse matching papers- Citations
- 39
- FWCI
- 9.45
- Field percentile
- top 1%
- Organism
- Assay
- Research Focus
- Approach
Reproducibility ledger
Nobody has reported trying to reproduce this paper yet. Did you replicate an experiment or run the code? Your report saves the next lab a week.
Sign in to file a reproducibility report.
Related papers
- Neural representations in visual and parietal cortex differentiate between imagined, perceived, and illusory experiences
Siyi Li, Xuemei Zeng, … Qing Yu·Journal of NeurosciencePeer-reviewed·Aug 15, 2023
- Sensory representations in primary visual cortex are not sufficient for subjective imagery
Giulia Cabbai, Chris Racey, … Sophie Forster·Current BiologyPeer-reviewed·Oct 16, 2024
- The post-hoc montage of perception: deep layers of primary visual cortex encode postdictive percepts
Pieter Barkema, Christoph Koenig, … Peter Kok·bioRxiv·Sep 20, 2026
- The human brain mechanisms of afterimages: From networks to cortical layers
Sharif I. Kronemer, Burak Akın, … Peter A. Bandettini·bioRxiv·Aug 30, 2025
- Neural dynamics of perceptual inference and its reversal during imagery
Nadine Dijkstra, Luca Ambrogioni, … Marcel A. J. van Gerven·eLifePeer-reviewed·Jul 20, 2020
- Neural interference between real and imagined visual stimuli
Alexander A Sulfaro, Amanda K. Robinson, Thomas A. Carlson·bioRxiv·Jan 5, 2024