CognitionNeurosciencePeer-reviewed journal article
Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations
Angeliki CharalampakiiD, Caroline PetersiD, Heiko MaureriD, Lisa Katharina MaureriD, Hermann MülleriD, Julius VerreliD, Elisa FilevichiD
Abstract
We can monitor our intentional movements, in order to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory -- given that it is not directly relevant to our goal -- and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched (congruent) or differed (incongruent). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d/d) between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations. HighlightsO_LIParticipants threw a virtual ball to hit a target C_LIO_LIFollowing their throw participants selected between two plausible trajectories C_LIO_LIOn half the trials, the two alternative trajectories differed in their distal outcome. C_LIO_LIDiscrimination and confidence were higher in trials with different outcome. C_LIO_LIMetacognitive performance was best in hit trials when the alternative missed. C_LI
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- FWCI
- 0.90
- Field percentile
- top 32%
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