B. Morsky

The evolution of partner specificity in mutualisms

This study develops an evolutionary game theoretic model to explore how cooperation and antagonism influence partner specificity in mutualisms, showing bistability and the stability of generalism under antagonistic specialization.

Suppressing evolution through environmental switching

The paper shows how environmental switching can suppress antibiotic resistance by exploiting competition between susceptible and resistant microbial strains.

Evolution of contribution timing in public goods games

The paper explores how the timing of contributions in public goods games evolves, showing that rapid or delayed contributions can be advantageous depending on group dynamics and cheating behaviors.

The blind choreographer: evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria

The paper presents a model of social norm evolution that links individual beliefs to population dynamics, showing how norms emerge from environmental correlations and affect coordination in games.

Cheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games

The paper shows that cheaters can benefit a population when facing a common enemy, using models of immune systems and pathogens.