Investigating Effects of Outcome Controllability and Error Attribution on Proactive Attentional Control: Insights from EEG and Cognitive Modelling

Abstract

Sense of agency (SoA), the experience of controlling ones actions and their consequences, is crucial for self-representation and adaptive goal-directed behavior. Classic comparator models explain SoA as the match between predicted and actual sensorimotor outcomes, whereas inference-based and Bayesian accounts emphasize cue integration and probabilistic weighting. Besides the influence of action-outcome contingencies on SoA, the feedback effect of perceived SoA on cognitive processing is also crucial for cognitive performance. Much of todays cognitive work is performed through interaction with devices that are not entirely reliable or are prone to operator error. Against this background, it is of particular interest whether the impact of an expectancy violation differs depending on whether the outcome is attributed to a malfunctioning system or to ones own mistake. To investigate this, the present EEG study deploys manipulated performance feedback in a color-discrimination task, while EEG was recorded. Thirty-five participants performed in this task with periods of veridical feedback, periods with feedback simulating an increased error rate, and periods of feedback suggesting malfunctioning response buttons. Behavioral performance was decomposed using the EZ-diffusion model, and time-frequency EEG analyses focused on event-related alpha, beta, and theta oscillations. The participants responded significantly slower in the self-attribution of errors condition compared to neutral feedback, and also significantly slower in the system-attribution of errors condition compared to self-attribution of errors. Decomposing behavior using drift-diffusion modeling indicates that a general decrease of response times with manipulated feedback can be attributed to decreased drift rates, whereas the difference between the self and system error conditions are reflected in the non-decision time. In the EEG, the manipulated feedback was reflected in attenuated decreases of occipital alpha and sensorimotor beta power during the cue-target interval. Furthermore, system-versus self-attributed errors elicited stronger feedback-locked midfrontal theta responses. Our findings suggest a functional dissociation within the agency inference process, where perceived controllability regulates preparatory investment of cognitive resources, while the attribution of action-outcome discrepancies seem to modulate sensory processes or motor-execution.