Anterior Insula Reflects Inferential Errors in Value-Based Decision-making and Perception

Abstract

The process of inference is theorized to underlie neural processes, including value-based decision-making and perception. Value-based decision-making commonly involves deliberation, a time-consuming process that requires conscious consideration of decision variables. Perception, by contrast, is thought to be automatic and effortless. To determine if inference characterizes both perception and value-based decision-making, we directly compared uncertainty signals in visual perception and an economic task using fMRI. We presented the same individuals with different versions of a bi-stable figure (Neckers cube) and with a gambling task during fMRI acquisition. To track the inferential process assumed in both tasks, we experimentally varied uncertainty, either on perceptual state or financial outcome. We found that inferential errors captured by surprise in the gambling task yielded BOLD responses in the anterior insula, in line with earlier findings. Moreover, we found perceptual risk and surprise in the Necker Cube task yielded similar responses in the anterior insula. These results suggest that uncertainty, irrespective of domain, correlates to a common brain region, the anterior insula. These findings provide empirical evidence that the brain interacts with its environment through inferential processes.