One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?

The \"cost of begging\" is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. More specifically, it predicts that there is a single cost function for the offspring (depending on e.g. offspring quality) that maintains honesty and it must be proportional to parents fitness loss. Here we show another interpretation of the cost. We demonstrate that cost, proportional to the fitness gain of the offspring, also results in honest signalling. Since the loss of the parent does not necessarily coincide with the gain of the offspring, it is provable that any linear combination of the two cost functions (one proportional to parents loss, one to offsprings gain) also leads to honest signalling. Our results, applied for a specific model, support the previous general conclusion that signalling games have different cost functions for different equilibria. Consequently, costly signalling theory cannot predict a unique equilibrium cost in signalling games especially in case of parent-offspring conflicts. As an important consequence, any measured equilibrium cost in real cases has to be compared both to the parents fitness loss and to the offsprings fitness gain in order to provide meaningfully interpretation.