S. Szamado

Moderate Diversity of activation thresholds promotes cooperation in the Threshold Public Good Games

The paper shows that moderate diversity in activation thresholds promotes cooperation in Threshold Public Good Games across various parameters.

Cue-driven microbial cooperation and communication: evolving quorum sensing with honest signalling.

This study investigates the evolutionary dynamics of quorum sensing in microbial cooperation, showing that cue-based signaling resists cheating and promotes cooperation under various environmental conditions.

General solution to biological signalling games: costly signalling and beyond

The paper refutes the Handicap Principle by showing that honest signals can have any cost value, including negative, without requiring costly signaling at equilibrium.

Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signaling: A laboratory experiment

This study conducts a human laboratory experiment to test whether condition-dependent signaling trade-offs or equilibrium signal costs maintain honest communication, finding trade-offs have a greater impact.

Scarce and directly beneficial reputations support cooperation

This study investigates how reputation systems support cooperation in social dilemmas, finding that scarcity and non-direct benefit earning enhance reputation credibility.

Help thine enemy: the evolution of short ranging signals.

This paper uses a game theoretical model to show that short-range signals can be evolutionarily stable by promoting honest communication of aggressive intent through improved distance estimation.

Juvenile honest food solicitation and parental investment as a life history strategy: a kin demographic selection model

The paper develops a kin demographic selection model to show that honest begging in offspring increases survival by reducing food variance and improving parental decision-making in asexual populations.

One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?

The paper shows that honest signaling in parent-offspring conflicts can result from costs proportional to offspring fitness gain, not just parent fitness loss, challenging the uniqueness of cost functions in signaling theory.

Caring for parents: an evolutionary rationale

The paper uses a demographic model to show that a rule encouraging resource allocation to post-fertile parents can spread through Darwinian competition despite reducing fertility rates of parents.