Philosophy and Theoretical Science

RIFT: A Fractal-Holographic Theory of Consciousness and Autopoietic Control

The paper introduces RIFT, a theory of consciousness proposing fractal compression and autopoietic feedback generate a holographic endospace for causal control of the molecular substrate.

What is it like to be a blob? A distributed, decentred and context-sensitive neurobiology of consciousness

The paper analyzes neuroimaging studies of consciousness to challenge the idea of an invariant core, showing distributed and context-sensitive brain activity patterns.

Collapse of local circuit integrated information {Phi} during NREM sleep

This study shows that integrated information {Phi} decreases in local neural circuits during NREM sleep compared to wakefulness and REM sleep, supporting Integrated Information Theory.

Beyond Integration: Neural Dimensionality and the Landau-Ginzburg Physics of Awareness

The paper introduces a framework using neural dimensionality and Landau-Ginzburg physics to model consciousness, generating testable predictions about phase transitions in brain states.

A Caveat Regarding the Unfolding Argument: Implications of Plasticity

The paper challenges the unfolding argument by showing that rapid plasticity in neural networks breaks functional equivalence between recurrent and feedforward networks, restoring empirical testability for theories involving plasticity.

Intrinsic Units: Identifying a system's causal grain.

This paper extends integrated information theory to identify intrinsic units by assessing cause-effect power at different grains in simulated systems.

Structured dynamics in the algorithmic agent

The paper explores how symmetry and structure in data influence the dynamics and organization of algorithmic agents, linking concepts from group theory, information theory, and neural networks.

Computational modelling shows evidence in support of both sensory and frontal theories of consciousness

The paper uses computational modeling to show that both sensory and frontal theories of consciousness can explain EEG data, with a slight preference for frontal theories.

Neural correlates of phenomenological attitude toward perceptual experience

The paper investigates the neural correlates of the phenomenological attitude (PA) by comparing brain activity during PA and natural attitude (NA) using fMRI, finding distinct activation patterns in action-related brain regions.

Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain

The paper uses intracranial recordings to show that visual awareness-related neural activity has two distinct temporal components, with the lateral prefrontal cortex linking them.

Criterion placement threatens the construct validity of neural measures of consciousness

This study shows that criterion placement biases neural measures of consciousness and unconscious processing, affecting their validity.

Comparing mental imagery experiences across visual, auditory, and other sensory modalities

The paper investigates how mental imagery experiences differ across visual, auditory, and other sensory modalities using a questionnaire, finding that auditory imagery is generally superior to visual imagery.

An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness

A preregistered multimodal neuroimaging study across 256 human participants directly tests Integrated Information Theory against Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, confirming some predictions while revealing major empirical challenges for both.

On the Non-uniqueness Problem in Integrated Information Theory

The paper demonstrates that the measure {Phi} in Integrated Information Theory is not uniquely defined, showing non-unique values arise from degeneracies in its calculation and introducing a tool to explore the full spectrum of possibilities.

Modelling perception as a hierarchical competition differentiates imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts

This paper models perception as hierarchical competition to differentiate imagined, veridical, and hallucinated percepts, showing that competition explains phenomenological differences.

Emergence of integrated information at macro timescales in real neural recordings

This paper investigates whether integrated information (Φ) emerges at macro timescales in real neural recordings, finding that normalized Φ peaks at 5 ms in fly brain data.

The Consciousness Theories Studies (ConTraSt) database: analyzing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories

The paper analyzes 412 consciousness studies to show how methodological choices predict theory support, revealing post-hoc interpretation trends in consciousness research.

More than just front or back: Parietal-striatal-thalamic circuits predict consciousness level

The paper investigates consciousness level by analyzing neural circuits in macaques, finding that parietal-striatal-thalamic circuits better predict consciousness than frontal circuits.

CHANging Consciousness Epistemically (CHANCE): An empirical method to convert the subjective content of consciousness into scientific data

This paper introduces a method called CHANCE to directly experience another person's consciousness content by reproducing their neural correlates, aiming to make subjective consciousness data scientifically objective.

Mathematics and the brain - a category theoretic approach to go beyond the neural correlates of consciousness

This paper introduces a category theory framework to analyze the relationship between consciousness and its neural correlates, applying it to integrated information theory and temporo-spatial theory.

A first-principle for the nervous system

The paper proposes a first-principle framework for understanding nervous system structure-function units through theoretical analysis and suggests their potential relevance to artificial intelligence.

Consciousness as a Concrete Physical Phenomenon

The paper presents a metatheory of consciousness arguing it is a concrete physical process that can be empirically observed and characterized, collapsing consciousness into a standard scientific problem.

Are The Neural Correlates Of Consciousness In The Front Or In The Back Of The Cerebral Cortex? Clinical And Neuroimaging Evidence

This paper reviews clinical and neuroimaging evidence to debate whether consciousness is linked to the frontal or posterior cortex.

Should A Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories Of Conscious Perception?

The paper challenges misconceptions about prefrontal cortex (PFC) role in conscious perception by showing empirical findings contradict claims that PFC lesions do not affect subjective perception or that PFC activity reflects only task demands.

Decoding The Brain: Neural Representation And The Limits Of Multivariate Pattern Analysis In Cognitive Neuroscience

This paper critiques the assumption that decodability implies representational content in neural data and proposes improvements to multivariate pattern analysis.

A LOGICAL INQUIRY OF EMOTIONS AND COGNITION

The paper uses first-order predicate logic to evaluate whether mind is a function of brain activity, if mental faculties can be reduced, and if cognition and emotion are distinct.