An absence of temporal filling-in at the physiological blind-spot.

Abstract

Visual objects that extend across physiological blind spots seem to encapsulate the extent of blindness, due to a process commonly referred to as a perceptual filling-in of spatial vision. It is unclear if temporal perception is similar, so we examined temporal relationships governing causality perception across the blind spot. We found the human brain does not allow for the time an object should take to traverse the blind-spot when engaging in a causal interaction. We also used electroencephalogram (EEG), to examine temporal signatures of elements flickering on and off in tandem, or in counter-phase. At a control site, we found more brain activity was entrained at the duty cycle by flicker relative to counter-phase changes, whereas these conditions were indistinguishable about blind spots. Our data suggest a common pool of neurons might encode temporal properties on either side of physiological blind-spots. This would explain the absence of any allowance for the extent of blindness in causality perception, and the weakened differences between temporal representations of flicker and counter-phased changes about the blind spot. Overall, our data suggest that, unlike spatial vision, there is no temporal filling-in for perceptual representations about physiological blind spots.